Proposal execution

In the GovernorBravo framework and OpenZeppelin Governor, execution closes a five-phase cycle. First the proposal is registered with its targets, values and calldatas. After an initial delay comes the voting period, around three days in Compound, with power read from the snapshot. If it clears quorum and majority, it is queued in the Timelock contract. Then a mandatory delay follows, two days in Compound, which is the key safeguard. Only afterward can anyone call execute, the point at which the Timelock fires the transactions. That delay lets users react to a malicious proposal that managed to pass.

It is where the vote becomes action with no intermediary: on-chain governance is executable, not merely advisory. The timelock before execution is the last line of defense against a governance attack that cleared the earlier phases, since it buys time to audit the proposal or move funds before it takes effect.

Compound's Timelock is the reference: it queues and executes after two days. The OpenZeppelin Governor plus TimelockController pairing is the standard used by protocols such as Uniswap, ENS and Optimism. As a counterexample, in the Beanstalk incident the malicious proposal executed in the same block, without an effective timelock, which allowed instant draining. Proposal execution is the step after the tally based on the voting power fixed by the snapshot, and it only fully applies in a DAO that has reached progressive decentralization with real on-chain governance.